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The Small, Imperfect Cinema of Afghanistan - Through the Work of Roya Sadat 
 
This thesis investigates Afghan cinema, reborn two decades ago with the establishment 
of new modes of governance and influenced by all the changes this brought. Following 
Teshome H. Gabriel, the project examines Afghan cinema according to three core 
means of investigation, as laid out in his critical Third World film theory: text, production 
and reception. It then supplements Gabriel’s schema with an analysis of the importance 
of education. After the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan’s post-conflict reconstruction and 
transition has been significantly shaped by neo-liberal economic policies that have 
strongly impacted its fragile film industry, as well as the country at large and its people’s 
lives. This thesis looks closely at the current infrastructures for cinema in Afghanistan via 
the journeys that filmmaker Roya Sadat has made through them and the circumstances 
under which her films have been made. It focuses on the management of complex 
forms of technical production, the mobilization of skilled labor and professional 
expertise, and the deployment of substantial resources in a situation of extreme 
economic and social duress. Afghan culture is steeped in poetry and stories upon which 
its cinema draws. There is a hunger to tell stories. This thesis melds evaluations of extra-
textual contexts with explorations of the cinematic language and narrative tropes of 
recent Afghan films in order to understand how this cinema connects and 
communicates with an Afghan audience. 
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Introduction 
 
My poetry is an image 
My poetry is an alarm  
My poetry is the complex look of my garden, and because of the fall briskly 
All of its flowers and plants are dried 
My poetry is the incubus of the time that is bleak 
My poetry is an image 
My poetry is an alarm  
My poetry is not an act for any gipsy of the market 
That would be my trade 
That gives be bread 
That gives me cloth 
That allows me a space in the line of wage earners 
My poetry is born out my devotion  
It is all feelings, it is all art 
My poetry is an image 




“Inja Afghanistan ast” which means “this is Afghanistan” is a repeated phrase you can 
hear in conversations with Afghans in Afghanistan and even Afghans who live in the 
diaspora. People use this line to justify the differences between where they live and how 
this country operates. Both men and women apply this phrase with negative 
connotations to express how, because this is Afghanistan, things just don’t work here or 
things are not going to change. This geographical attention to a country, whose location 
- lying along important trade routes such as the Silk Road and those connecting 
Southern and Eastern Asia to Europe and the Middle East - has long been a prize 
sought by empire builders, which for millennia, great armies have attempted to subdue. 
                                                
1 Translated by the author.  
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Afghanistan’s geographical location provides the backdrop for looking at Afghanistan as 
not simply a place but a calamity, a situation. 
The instability in the region has not only hampered the progress of Afghan 
society but also decreased the development of its cinema. Afghan cinema has been 
inextricably linked to the different conflicts that have marked the social context of the 
country and the region. But as the country continues to cope with the consequences of 
past developments, the current political situation reveals a tone unique to this part of the 
world. The new political establishment demonstrates enthusiasm for Afghan film. The fall 
of the Taliban regime in 2001 marked a new beginning for the country’s film industry to 
rise again. Afghan film-makers returned home from the diaspora and things started up 
again thanks to hard work and effort. 
Filmmaking as an ideological tool becomes an instrument for social 
transformation through individual and indigenized themes which focused on the lives 
and struggles of people. As a result, cinema has allowed the opportunity to relate what 
Afghan society has experienced during the years of its most radical repression and how 
they are coping with this new situation. Teshome H. Gabriel, in his essay “Third Cinema 
as the Guardian of Popular Memory,” accounts for the impetus behind Third Cinema as 
“participatory and contributive to the struggles for the liberation of the people of 
the Third World.”2 Some of the works of Afghan cinema have explored ways of 
understanding the voice and testimony that move away from the traditional formulas 
repeated by the mass media and by the most commercial cinemas; they introduce a 
reflection on the expressive possibilities available to tell an Afghan story.  
While most of the Afghan population is not educated, not even able to read and 
write, cinema and movies can help Afghans to discover more about themselves, as well 
                                                
2 Teshome H. Gabriel, “Third Cinema as the Guardian of Popular Memory.” In Questions of Third World 
Cinema, ed. Pines, Jim (British Film Institute. 1990), 55.  
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as the outside world. This nation has lived through so many impediments, and for so 
long, without the mirror of cinema that one could almost say it does not recognize its 
own image.  
Roya Sadat as a Third World filmmaker, tries to mirrors this society. Her work is the 
prism through which this thesis examines Afghan film production. Her films, with their 
geopolitical implications, show the impact of war on people’s lives, the conflict between 
tradition and modernity, race, class, tyranny, cultural practices, revolution, colonialism 
and a weak economy. Sadat’s work relies more on an appeal to the social and political 
conflicts her characters face as its primary rhetorical strategy and less on the example of 
individual psychoanalytic processes and their resolution. There is no solution to the 
misery of her characters. We meet them before the clash of their unstable situations and 
follow them as they struggle to survive and we leave them as they find no way out of the 
hostility of their environment. As Teshome H. Gabriel writes “the individual 'Hero' in 
Third World context does not make history, they only serve historical necessities.”3   
Once more Teshome H. Gabriel, in his article “Toward a Critical Theory of Third 
World Films,” looks at the three components of Third World critical film theory - the text, 
the production and the reception - that are drawn from the cultural history of Third 
World people. Afghan filmmakers such as Sadat have demonstrated a profound 
understanding of the potential of small budget films, not only for the future of Afghan 
cinema, but also for the progress of the new country as whole. While any film project is 
itself a collaborative work drawing on professional and non-professional skills, in the case 
of Sadat, it is more a joining of forces. Because of the impoverished economic and social 
development, there is a lack of material resources such as film technology and funding, 
                                                
3 Teshome H. Gabriel. "Toward a Critical Theory of Third World Films." In Questions of Third World 
Cinema, ed. Pines, Jim. (British Film Institute. 1990), 48 
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which are available to some, not to all. All these conditions force the filmmaker to use 
any available means to fulfill their project.  
Focusing on these three components, text, production and reception, in Sadat’s 
films, assists us in seeing the political point of view of the director, while simultaneously 
shedding light on Afghan cinema’s fragmented infrastructure. The text (film) becomes 
the intersection of cultural codes and sub codes, and the formal thematic and grammar 
of the film are based on the daily life of people which is intertwined and rooted in the 
cultural history of the Third World more generally. In her films, Sadat looks at the 
traditions, customs and social and economic struggles of Afghan people. She doesn’t 
see the need to introduce these traditions, or explain the circumstance of their struggles, 
because the audience of her films are the Afghan people, whose lives run parallel with 
the narratives of her films. But on the component issue of production, it is the low 
security and poor economy of the country that are still fragile after decades of warfare.  
Though filmmaking had a promising future in first decade of the 21st century, in 
recent years, the fighting between the Afghan government and Taliban and ISIS forces 
have intensified and the suicide attacks that are continuously happening within the cities 
and especially in public areas have deteriorated the security situation even more. For 
these reasons, filmmakers face great challenges for the production of their film projects 
in terms of finance and security and also, for the same reason, these films never get 
screened in the limited local theaters. The only way that people can see these films is via 
CDs, DVDs and television, if they get broadcast through private television channels. 
 
Theory and Methodology  
Yet before looking at the current situation of cinema in Afghanistan, I will outline how this 
research project contributes to the field of Afghan film studies. In particular, I do this by 
illuminating the central relations between governance, sovereignty, and power, and their 
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combined connections to film. In examining the cinema of Afghanistan after 2001, I 
explore the limitations and potential of the visual arts to represent the diversity of 
embodied Afghan experiences. However, the scope of this study is limited in how it can 
represent the views of filmmaker(s) and film industry experts. This project is mainly 
focused on the work of one Afghan filmmaker, which neither draws a complete image of 
Afghan cinema, nor fully represents the culture to which it is supposed to belong. 
Rather, this thesis endeavors to tell the multifaceted story of cinema through the works of 
Roya Sadat, as a medium of and tool for social change in a society that is entering into 
pivotal but highly uncertain times. 
As each chapter will elaborate, this study examines the links between art, culture, 
cinema, and conflict, posing the following research questions: to what extent is 
cinematic production reflexive of and a participant in the public sphere developing in 
Afghanistan? How do Afghan artists understand their own society? Can cinema bridge 
the communication gap between religious and non-religious citizens, between different 
ethnicities, between generations and genders? What reflections are taking place in 
newly formed assumptions about the role of the artist as citizen? In tackling these 
questions, I will provide an in-depth examination of the role of art and cultural activities 
in addressing violence and building trust, facilitating dialogue and promoting 
intercultural competency and understanding. Using a case-study methodology, the 
chapters to come offer a closer exploration of art and cultural activities in Afghanistan.  
This project is mostly based on interviews with film directors, writers, professors of 
film and cinema at Kabul University, film producers, technician personnel, and press 
materials published on Afghan film and its cinema. A semi-structured research 
questionnaire guided all interviews. Additional information was collected through email 
exchanges with research participants.   
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Most of my fieldwork was conducted in Kabul, a city that is the most ethnically 
diverse space in the country. Roya Film House, which is the first film production company 
established after 2001 by Roya and Alka Sadat, two filmmaker sisters, is located in Kabul. 
The city has often been the location of film productions; the home for TV and news 
outlets; the venue of various film festivals; and host to most NGOs and foreign 
organizations. The international presence in Kabul ensures an audience and funding to 
promote not just cultural production, but particularly contemporary art made by women. 
As much as the city also creates new hierarchies of power and domination because of its 
transportation, medical, education, and telecommunication sectors, it also remains the 
locale from which artists may experience new forms of social mobility. My focus on Kabul 
as the center of power and opportunity for investments and higher education was 
informed by the fact that it has represented a site of political possibilities for artists, 
activists, and women, while simultaneously notions of corruption, security and law and 
order problems and air and water pollution remain deeply associated with that space in 
the collective imagination.  
I recognize that my own identity as a researcher cannot be abstracted from the 
research process. First, I situate myself as an Afghan Canadian who has received an 
academic education in Canadian universities. One of the challenges I have set myself for 
this project is to look at the subject mostly through non-Western scholars. Because of the 
conservative structures of power and domination that prevail in Western culture, and the 
inequalities that exist in a globalized world-system, from political institutions in general to 
film industries in particular, and because of the capacity limitations of Western theories 
to describe or explain other contexts than those for which they were created, it is 
necessary to adopt theories and perspectives that have been produced locally rather 
than extrapolating Euro-American conceptual models.  
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After the attacks of 9/11, Afghanistan became a center for media attention. News 
about the Taliban, especially their treatment of Afghan women, became the subject of 
many political debates. Images of the Afghan woman, covered in her burka, were on the 
front pages of major news outlets. The visual identity and cinematic construction of 
Afghanistan has been shaped and sustained through various representations through 
news media outlets, documentaries, and cinematic productions. Western films offer 
representations of Afghanistan as a warlord-ridden land of strife and oppression, and 
Afghan people as barbarians, ferocious Pashtun tribesmen, or noble savages. The 
influential essay, “On Violence,” by Frantz Fanon, details how representational violence is 
consistently done to the colonized and formerly colonized world - the regions that are 
now labelled the Global South - by these sorts of images. I will later use this text as a way 
through which to understand constructions of the visual identity of Afghan people.  
There is a great demographic diversity of ethnicity and languages in Afghanistan, 
with many minor communities living in extremely remote environments due to the 
mountainous topography of the country. In, Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of 
Language in African Literature, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o argues that, through storytelling, 
alongside everyday communication and shared experience in the mother tongue, 
African culture is able to be transmitted to and through communities and across 
generations. People write in order to communicate ideas and writing in a major world 
language communicates the author’s ideas more widely than doing so in a small 
regional language. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, however, argues for targeting a primary 
audience -speakers of marginalized languages - through language and its particularity to 
a specific social/historical context. Concerning the making of films regarding marginal 
communities, it would be possible to argue on purely artistic grounds that a local 
language is simply better at describing certain things – the rhythms of daily life, say, or 
regional wildlife – than another.  
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Another key theoretical approach for this project is Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari’s idea of the ‘minor movement’, first introduced in Kafka: Toward a Minor 
Literature. I believe that Afghan cinema, and especially Roya Sadat’s cinema, is minor 
cinema as defined by the French philosophers as a movement where “the minor takes a 
major voice and speaks it in a way that expresses one’s preferred identity.”4 For Deleuze 
and Guattari, a minor work is inexorably political because its characters are linked to a 
larger social framework: an individual story “necessarily expresses social contradictions 
and problems, or directly suffers their effects.”5 This self-representation, as a form of self-
empowerment, gives an opportunity for Afghans to engage with the powerful 
ideologies of mass media in the region, as well as in the West. This position enables the 
filmmaker to express another possible community and to forge the means for different 
consciousness and another sensibility.  
Due to Afghanistan’s history of wars with different world powers, Paulo Freire’s 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed is another critical source that I will rely on. Freire believed 
that any attempt to construct a theory of action with the oppressed must involve a 
serious and sincere attempt to understand the realities of their daily lives. Therefore, he 
emphasizes the importance of dialogue and co-creation of knowledge. Freire states that 
the key to liberation is the awakening of a critical awareness and thinking process in the 
individual. While Freire mostly looks at the education system, I will argue that cinema is 
another vehicle of liberation, for at its core lies the desire to give voice to the oppressed 
through dialogue and the co-creation of knowledge.  
 The U.S. needed global support for the invasion of Afghanistan as a War against 
Terrorism, and the plight of women in Afghanistan, among other concerns, as a 
humanitarian crisis justified military intervention. Reversing abuses of women’s rights 
                                                
4 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 1986). 18. 
5 Gilles Deleuze and Félix, Guattari. 1986. Cinema 2. The Time-Image. (London: Continuum. 2005). 224. 
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became an explicit policy goal, at least at the level of rhetoric. Certainly, the impact of 
this invasion superseded the dynamics of gendered disadvantage, which already existed 
in a patriarchal society such as Afghanistan’s. Yet, its influence over, for example, the 
erosion of local livelihoods and growing poverty, the criminalization of the economy, and 
insecurity due to the predations of armed groups and factions, increased after the 2001.  
Deniz Kandiyoti, in The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan (2007), 
draws attention to the crippling disconnection between different facets of post-conflict 
transition. The processes of institutional development and reform which started since the 
Bonn Agreement in 2001 and the attempts at securing women’s rights in the troubled 
history of state-building and state-society relations in Afghanistan have not succeeded 
entirely. As Deniz Kandiyoti notes,  
combinations of new pressures (such as poverty, indebtedness and predation by 
local strongmen) and existing practices (such as the early marriage of girls against 
the payment of bride price) create outcomes that may easily be misidentified as 
unmediated expressions of local “culture”, thus detracting critical attention from 
the full nexus of influences that deepen the vulnerability of girls and women.6  
 
The tension has persisted between a rentier state bolstered by foreign subsidies, which 
had a relatively weak engagement with society, in changes in social relations, especially 
in regards to women’s rights, and a rural hinterland that both resisted the incursions of 
the state and attempted to represent tribal interests within it.  
 Regardless of Afghanistan’s diversity of linguistic, ethnic, and cultural practices, 
Afghanistan as a nation has shared bodily experiences that came upon its people. The 
solidarity which Chandra Talpade Mohanty, in Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing 
                                                
6 Deniz Kandiyoti. “The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan,” United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development, Geneva, 2005), 25. 
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Theory, Practicing Solidarity, introduces in "sisterhood," "experience," and "community" 
have been guidelines for this research which looks into how film and Afghan filmmakers 
can focus on links between the daily life of Afghan people in different parts of the 
country, with collective action, the theory and pedagogy of Third World and international 
feminism and activism.  
 Despite all the promises of the post-Taliban era, Afghan cinema struggles at every 
phase of filmmaking. As there is no system of state funding for film, Afghan filmmakers 
can’t afford to work independently of foreign donors or Afghan television budgets and 
acting in total artistic independence remains an aspiration for them. Beyond production, 
distribution is also another issue which Afghan film-makers and producers are facing. 
While only seventeen movie theaters, which were built during Communist era, are active 
in the country and are in state of decay, they only screen B movies from Hollywood and 
Bollywood.  
 This project investigates the current cinema infrastructure of Afghanistan through 
the journey of Roya Sadat and the circumstances in which her films are produced, 
distributed and received by Afghan audiences. Following Teshome H. Gabriel, it looks at 
the three core components of his Third World critical film theory: the text, the 
production and the reception. 
Chapters one to three of this project assess Sadat’s films under these terms. The 
first chapter will give a brief history of cinema in Afghanistan, which is intertwined with its 
political history, starting in early twenty century in order understand its output as text. The 
second chapter will focus on the theme of production and the parameters governing 
cinematic production in Afghanistan, through a close look at Sadat’s first film Three Dots 
(2003), and also her latest film A Letter to the President (2017). The third chapter will 
concentrate on the theme of distribution, especially as regards Sadat’s first feature film, A 
Letter to the President (2017). The reception of local media products is another 
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important element that it will be investigated with reference to several films; Osama, 
(Siddiq Barmak, 2003), Three Dots, Playing the Taar, The Patience Stone, (Atiq Rahimi, 
2012), and A Letter to President), to grasp how Afghan artists understand their own 
society and how, in turn, cultural and historical elements play a role in connecting these 
films with the people. Although Teshome Gabriel’s does not include education as a 
components of his critical theory of Third Cinema, I strongly believe that cinematic 
education and training is crucial for the future generation of filmmakers in a country such 
as Afghanistan. In chapter four, I will examine the history and challenges of education, 
the limited access to education that prevent social integration and national 
development, and how these circumstances are impacting the training and cinematic 
education.  
This thesis therefore looks closely, and from four different angles, at a cinema that 
was reborn two decades ago with the establishment of new modes of governance, and 
all the changes they brought. The arrival of 3G internet and other technologies, the 
establishment of the faculty of cinema in Kabul University, and the operation of different 
private film training institutes, film festivals, especially in Kabul, which showcase Afghan 
productions, are the changes that have impact on Afghan cinema. With all these 
alterations, can one be hopeful that Afghan audiences observe their own national 
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Chapter One 
 
In 2015, on one winter night in Winnipeg, Canada, the author of An Accented Cinema: 
Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking (2001) Hamid Naficy was giving a talk. Following this, I 
asked him in casual conversation about the omission of Afghan films from his book. His 
reason was the inaccessibility of films from Afghanistan. It is true that, before the fall of 
the Taliban in 2001, few had heard of or seen an Afghan production, especially in the 
West. However, many things changed after the Taliban lost power and, with the 
establishment of a transitional government, Afghan cinema returned from the dead. In 
order to keep pace with the events now unfolding in Afghanistan, it is necessary to 
provide some context by looking Afghanistan’s history and then examine the modest, 
yet boisterous, history of cinema in Afghanistan.  
Afghanistan has long been a hub of diverse cultures due to its location as the 
nodal point between the civilizations of India, East Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East 
and thence Europe. "Afghanistan, a nation of minorities"7 has demographics comprised 
of four major ethnic groups: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek. Numerous other minor 
ethnic groups - Nuristani, Baluchi, Turkmen, and Aimaq – also call Afghanistan home. In 
addition to the official languages of the country, Dari and Pashto, the government has 
also recognized five other languages for their regional importance: Hazaragi, Uzbek, 
Turkmen, Balochi, and Pashayi. There are also some minor languages including Vasi-vari, 
Tregami, Askunu, and Kalasha-ala. This diversity has made Afghan society a complex and 
complicated entity for the United Nations and NATO in their mission for the state-
building process.  
                                                
7 Nassim Jawad. “Afghanistan: A Nation of Minorities.” Minority Rights Group (1992). 
https://minorityrights.org/publications/afghanistan-a-nation-of-minorities-february-1992/ 
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The ancient settlers in Afghanistan were the Persians, under Darius the Great 
(522-486 BCE)8; and the Greeks, led by Alexander the Great (356-323 BCE).9 A Buddhist 
civilization flourished from the late first century CE, its kings reigning in Bamiyan until the 
end of the 10th century. An Arab raid on Kandahar in 699-700 brought Islam, 
strengthened as the Turks gained power in Iran, Afghanistan and India. The Mongolian, 
Genghis Khan, invaded in the 13th century. For the next few hundred years, Afghanistan 
was fought over by various Indian and Persian empires. Finally, in the 18th century, a 
group of Pashtun tribes under Ahmad Shah Durrani defeated the Moghuls and the 
Persians to consolidate his own large but unstable empire. 
The subsequent political events marked a turning point in Afghanistan’s modern 
history that have impacted it until today. It is, therefore, imperative to analyse how 
international historical and political context influenced the country’s national policies and 
legacies that continue to shape Afghanistan’s current and future developments 
including economic, cultural and educational.  
The Anglo-Russian power struggle known as ‘The Great Game’ during the 19th 
century sited Afghanistan strategically. Britain tried to bring Afghanistan under direct 
rule, but suffered resounding defeat in the first Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42).10 During 
the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878-8011, Afghanistan lost considerable territory and 
control of its external affairs to Britain. Britain provided modern weapons and an annual 
subsidy to Afghanistan’s rulers in order to keep Russia at bay and protect its Indian 
colony. Abdur-Rahman Khan (1881-1901), with the support of the British, by whom he 
was later patronized financially, politically, and militarily, signed the Durand Line 
                                                
8 Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban (New 
York: Da Capo Press. 2002), 8. 
9 Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History, 17. 
10 Ibid. 136. 
11 Ibid. 204. 
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Agreement on November 12, 189312, drawing an official border between British India, 
known today as Pakistan, and Afghanistan. This agreement split the Pashtun people into 
two separate countries. At his death in 1901, Abdur-Rahman Khan was succeeded by his 
son, Habibullah. 
Amir Habibullah Khan (ruling from 1901 to 1919) maintained satisfactory relations 
with British India in return for an annual subsidy and retaining full control of his country’s 
internal affairs. He introduced reforms in Afghanistan, including a modern style of 
education, electricity, automobiles, and Western medical methods. Cinema was also 
among this list of what was bought into Afghanistan by Amir Habibullah Khan13, with the 
screening of silent films from other countries in the early 1920s. Screenings took place in 
the monarch’s palace for noble audiences only. 
After World War One, pressure was mounting for full independence. Habibullah 
Khan’s antiwar policy was unpopular with the young anti-British elements in the 
population. In 1919, he was assassinated and his son Amanullah seized the throne and 
declared independence. His era (1919-1929) was characterized by modernisation 
reforms of political authority, state institution and society. He deviated from his father 
(Amir Habibullah Khan) and his grandfather (Abdur-Rahman Khan)’s policies in domestic 
and foreign affairs, and entered into diplomatic and economic relationship with the 
Soviet Union, Germany, Italy Turkey and Iran. This international policy, brought 
Afghanistan out of isolation and boosted different channels in economic, cultural and 
educational development. 
Britain was defeated in a Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919-21 and Afghanistan 
regained control over its foreign affairs. The new king undertook land reform, 
regularized taxes, extended education and gave the country its first constitution. But his 
                                                
12 Ibid, 218. 
13 Abdul-Wahid Nazari. The Evolution Process of Cinema in Afghanistan. (Ministry of culture Press, 2011), 5. 
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attempts to shift power away from village elders and the religious establishment led to 
revolts and he was toppled in 1938. A Tajik called Bacha-yi-Saqao seized power, but was 
soon deposed and executed by a Pashtun, Nadir Khan – who started a dynasty that was 
to last until 1978. 
A new era started with Nadir Khan (aka Nadir Shah (1929–78)) and was 
characterized by defragmentation of political authority, selective policy and strong ethnic 
(Pashtun) nationalism. Nadir Shah was in power from 1929-33, and he continued 
Afghanistan’s modernization through road construction, building a national army, and 
establishing a faculty of medicine and a banking system. Nadir Khan was assassinated by 
a student in 1933, he was succeeded by his 19-year-old son Mohamed Zahir (Zahir Shah 
(1933–73)). Zahir Shah undertook a number of economic development projects, 
including irrigation and highway construction, backed by foreign aid, largely from the 
United States and the Soviet Union. In 1964, he established a constitutional monarchy 
and prohibited royal relatives from holding public office. This constitutional monarchy 
lasted till 1973. During this time, intellectuals enjoyed greater freedom; women began 
to enter the workplace and government.  
In a bloodless coup on July 17, 1973, Zahir Shah was deposed. The leader of the 
coup, General Mohammad Daoud Khan proclaimed Afghanistan a republic with himself 
as its president. During the Cold War, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) 
and the United States (U.S.), poured aid into the country, and, during Daoud Khan’s 
brief rule, the country benefited from oil and gas revenues. Kabul was full of students 
and its University was a hotbed of political ideology – both Communist and Islamic. 
Women and men studied together and came into contact with foreign teachers. 
On 27 April 1978, Daoud was overthrown and killed in a communist coup (the 
Saur Revolution) led by Afghanistan’s People’s Democratic Party (PDPA). Noor 
Mohammed Taraki took power, but his Marxist land and social reforms led to violent 
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demonstrations. The U.S.S.R. increased aid to Taraki’s regime; meanwhile, the U.S. 
actively supported resistance groups. The U.S.S.R.’s President Breshnev, fearing the U.S. 
would take advantage of mounting chaos, sent in troops to Afghanistan in December 
1979. Breshnev believed the Soviet army would be able to withdraw after six months.14 
During the ten-year invasion by the Soviet army in Afghanistan, after Taraki, two 
different communist governments came to power and both were unable to control the 
national uprisings. Soviet forces responded by destroying agriculture and livestock in 
order to cut off supplies to the resistance. Russian bombing of villages claimed nearly a 
million Afghan lives. International support came via Mujahidin groups exiled in Pakistan 
which were funded mainly by the US, Saudi Arabia and China. The U.S. poured in 
money and weapons to arm the opposition through the Pakistani secret intelligence 
services known as the ISI. By the late 1980s, aid from the US and Saudi Arabia reached 
around $1 billion per year; while between 1986 and 1990 around $5 billion worth of 
weapons went to the ‘holy fighters’ of the Afghan Mujahideen.15 
 
“Cinema in the Midst of Struggle”16   
Ultimately, after the introduction of cinema in early 20th century by Habibullah Khan, it 
took a long time for the first Afghan film to be produced. Love and Friendship, directed 
by Rashid Latif 194617, was a co-production with India. This film was followed by several 
other films such as Smugglers (1950) and Friday Night (1950), both directed by Alil 
Rawnaq, and Difficult Days (1952), directed by Wali Latifi. During the late 1950s, Indian 
films began to dominate the commercial cinema market in Afghanistan. Soon after, 
against a backdrop of growing nationalism, local filmmakers emerged to produce films 
                                                
14 Tanner, Afghanistan: A military History, 234. 
15 Tanner, Afghanistan: A military History, 250. 
16 The term borrowed from a screening series in Concordia University 
17 Nazari, The Evolution Process of Cinema in Afghanistan. 15. 
 18  
which identified Afghanistan as an independent nation. Afghanistan’s first home-grown 
feature film, Rabi’a Balkhi, was made in 1965 by Daoud Farani and A.K Halil. A major box 
office success, it took as its subject matter the life and times of the eponymous 10th-
century princess and poetess from Balkh. 
The national film institute, Afghan Film, which is a state-run production company, 
was established in 1968, and it set up the National Film Archives and its own film 
laboratory. Until then, filmmakers had to send their negatives to be developed to India 
or the Soviet Union. The Afghan Film Organization started by producing documentaries 
and newsreels, highlighting the official meetings and conferences of the government. In 
the absence of television, all these films were shown in cinemas before Indian feature 
films.  
Beside Afghan Film, other private film studios companies emerged at this 
moment, such as Nazir Films, Ariana Films, and Shafaq Films that produced around 
seventy films during this period. The films made during this time drew applause at film 
festivals in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Some of these titles were very 
successful in the Tashkent Film Festival, such as Mother’s Advice (Abdul- Khaleq A'lil, 
1972), Villages are Awakened (Abdul- Khaleq A'lil, 1982), Hot Summer in Kabul (Vali Latifi 
& Ali Hamraeive, 1983), and Escape (Latif Ahmadi, 1984). In conversation with Latif 
Ahmadi, known as engineer Latif - a much-loved film director and head of the state-run 
cinema agency, Afghan Film, under the communist government – who calls the mid-
1970s and 80s the golden age of Afghanistan cinema, Ahmadi talks about how going to 
the movies was a leisure activity for entertainment, a form of pleasure and delight for 
everyone. He says that in those days, film and cinema were exciting forms of 
entertainment, especially in big urban centers. Afghans youth and families alike flocked 
to movie theaters with some of them operating until midnight to fulfil the high demand. 
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There was even a special movie theater, Cinema Zeinab, reserved exclusively for 
women.18 
While Afghan cinema production has remained far less prolific than that of any 
other country in the region, and its cinema underdeveloped because of a poor 
economy, it experienced a thriving period in the last century, started in late 1970s with 
the founding of the Afghan Film institute by King Mohammad Zahir Shah (1914-2007). 
Film production rose during the Communist era (1978 to 1992). During this period 
many contentious reforms took place, such as equal rights for women, universal 
education and extensive land reform. Changes in society were, of course, depicted in 
films, where women were portrayed as strong and independent characters that made 
their own decisions (Sculpture are Laughing (Toryalei Shafagh, 1975)); or films where the 
farmers were encouraged to use modern technology to yield better harvests (Villages 
Are Awakening (Abdul-Khaliq Alill, 1981)). Also, these farmers valued education and sent 
their young children to school. 
After the April Coup of 1978, with the new socialist government and Nur 
Muhammad Taraki as the head of the Khalq Party and the government, fortified by the 
Soviet occupation, the notion of propaganda films arose and censorship was imposed 
on films whose content was not in line with the new government and the party doctrine. 
With the short-lived presidency of Hafizullah Amin (14 Sept 1979 – 27 Dec 1979), 
another communist politician who came into power after Taraki, the intensity of control 
and censorship increased as did the production of propaganda films about the 
revolution. During this period, Soviet trainers were brought into the country and Afghans 
were offered scholarships and sent abroad to study in the U.S.S.R. Several of them 
                                                
18 Latif Ahmadi. Interview with Soraya Ata. Personal interview. Kabul August 18, 2018 
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received scholarships to study at the filmmaking school of The Gerasimov Institute of 
Cinematography a.k.a. VGIK and at universities in Eastern European countries.19  
In an interview with the BBC, director Siddiq Barmak who was the recipient of this 
scholarship and studied in Moscow Film Institute (VGIK), talked about the use of film as 
propaganda in this period. He mentions that even Hafizullah Amin wrote a script about 
the Saur Revolution, and he and his family were supposed to act in this film.20 Barmak, 
who was working with Engineer Latif at that time on production of the film, adds that 
during filming the segment about the last days of Daoud Khan government, the red flag 
of the Khalq Party was brought down and the three stripes flag of Daoud Khan put back 
on the presidential palace, while army planes were flying over the location. People in the 
city who didn’t know that this was for the film thought that the previous government had 
come back into power. They gathered in the nearest intersections to the presidential 
palace to show their excitement. Men ran into shops to buy razors to shave their 
mustaches which was the look of Khaliqi’s supporters. Amin’s government arrested a 
substantial number of people accusing them of being counterrevolutionary.  
At the same time, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. were engaged in the Cold War and 
the U.S. was genuinely interested in building counter-power to the U.S.S.R. The U.S. 
ultimately followed a non-intervention plan, resulting instead in the funding of troops, 
the Mujahedeen, under Reagan's presidency. To make sure of the success of the plan, it 
was sold on with religious and nationalist tones in its rhetoric. The fighters were 
convinced that they would ultimately liberate their country from the foreign invaders. The 
driving motto of the Mujahideen, who were mostly people from the countryside, was 
that every Muslim’s duty is to fight the godless, atheist, Communist menace and to drive 
                                                
19 Alam Payind. "Soviet-Afghan Relations from Cooperation to Occupation," International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 21, no. 1 (1989): 107-28. http://www.jstor.org/stable/163642. 
20 Karim Heidari. “Afghanistan Cinema in the Ray of April 7 Coup” BBC. April 26, 2018, 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan-43893986 
 21  
it out of Afghanistan. In April 1988, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev 
subsequently carried out an earlier promise to begin withdrawing Soviet troops in May 
of that year; troops began leaving as scheduled, and the last Soviet soldier left 
Afghanistan in February 1989. The occupation had left 1.5 million Afghans dead, five 
million disabled, and five million refugees; the country was abandoned by the world and 
Afghanistan turned into violent anarchy.  
The bulk of the military support that was given to the Mujahedeen - with the 
purpose of fighting the Russians - then turned against itself, with different hard-line 
factions quickly beginning to fight among themselves. The communist government, 
under President Dr. Najib, was still holding control of the capital city, Kabul. The chaotic 
power struggle between four main armed groups – Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and 
Uzbeks, the violence between them from the crossfire of bombs and rockets in various 
attempts to take control over Kabul – left the city in complete ruins. It was not jihad 
anymore, it was a struggle for power. In April 1992, the Mujahideen took control over 
Kabul and declared an Islamic State. Four main groups, each with their own foreign 
backers, fought for control of Kabul. Thousands of Kabul’s residences had died and 
around a million had been displaced. Rape was condoned by most factional leaders. 
Other cities suffered similar fates. 
In 1994, a small group of religious students (or Taliban), living near Kandahar 
under the leadership of Mullah Omar, objected to the behaviour of the Mujahideen 
commanders controlling the area. With support from elements in Pakistan, they 
launched a military campaign aimed at creating an Islamic State based on strict sharia 
law. They imposed order, collected weapons, tore down checkpoints to extort money 
and refused to take bribes. Saudi Arabia provided funds, goods and diplomatic support 
and Pakistan trained fighters and sent personnel into Afghanistan to fight alongside the 
Taliban from 1994-2001. Osama bin Laden, who, during the Soviet occupation had 
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funded and trained Arab Mujahideen recruits, returned to Afghanistan in 1996.21 By 
2000, the Taliban controlled 90 per cent of Afghan territory, but were only officially 
recognized by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the UAE.  
During the Mujahideen period and then especially through the Taliban regimes, 
filmmaking was brought to an abrupt halt. The Mujahideen burned or changed the use 
of movie theaters across the country. Because of the location of these buildings, usually 
in the center of town, and located at busy intersections, the warlords seized them for 
themselves as power hubs. If warlords could not appropriate the buildings, they were 
burned down in acts of iconoclasm, with cinema taken as symbols of communism and 
the West. Starting in 1993, the production of films was banned by fundamentalist rulers. 
The Taliban (1994-2001) came with more severe laws about film, cinema and art in 
general. They marked their headquarters and checkpoints with rolls of loose film and 
cassettes dangling from bars. 
  On several occasions, they attempted to burn down the whole film archive. They 
did, in fact, burn all the prints of foreign films.22 There are different narratives and 
debates on how Afghan Film Archive is being saved. One story involves the interference 
of the Taliban Minister of Culture, who personally came to the archive building and 
inform the staff about the Taliban’s plan of destroying the archive. The other narrative 
relates the heroic act of the lab technician Khwaja Ahmadshah and a colleague, who 
saved the archive by hiding the negatives of Afghan productions and left on the shelves 
the prints and the foreign films whose negatives were presumably safe elsewhere. They 
placed the reels in a hidden room, nailed a blackboard on its entry and painted it over to 
disguise it. The Taliban came and burn what was left behind. 
                                                
21 Tanner, Afghanistan: A military History, 286. 
22 A Flickering Truth. Directed by Pietra Brettkelly. New Zealand: Umbrella Entertainment, 2015. DVD. 
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In 2001, things started to change in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda, under the leadership 
of Osama bin Laden operatives, hijacked four commercial airliners, crashing them into 
the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Although 
Afghanistan was the base for al-Qaeda, none of the nineteen hijackers were Afghan 
nationals. After the 11 September 2001 attacks, the U.S. demanded the Taliban hand 
Osama bin Laden over to face US justice. Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar 
refused and on 7th of October 2001, less than a month after the September 11 attacks, 
U.S. President George W. Bush launched an operation with the mission of fighting the 
“War Against Terror” in Afghanistan. The British supported the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan that initially involved U.S. airstrikes and bombing. Then there was a wave of 
conventional ground forces as military classified peacekeepers from Canada, Australia, 
Germany, and France later pledged support to this campaign of promoting stability and 
aid delivery. By the end of 2001, the United Nations administrated the process of 
implementing a transitional Afghan government from consultations held in Bonn, 
Germany. Soon after, foreign investments, NGOs, and aid organizations poured capital 
resources into urban centers, especially Kabul, with the capital city developed into a 
transnational space. This opened a line of flight for Afghan cinema to reach new heights.  
 
A Recent History of Afghan Cinema - Art and Culture During the Transitional Period 
In a post-conflict society, art is a part of national reconciliation efforts, including film, 
music, crafts, architecture and theater, among other art forms; these have played a key 
role in reducing the emotional burdens of war that usually leave deep scars in a country’s 
psyche and peacebuilding efforts. Using anecdotal evidence, the use of theater helps 
national audiences express difficult emotions, re-examine established ideas, and 
improve their emotional well-being. Important to note here is that every country’s 
experience in using art in their reconciliation process is different – influenced by anything 
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from their history of conflict to their state’s engagement of cultural policies. The 
government, as the main supporter of this effort, works alongside different partners to 
establish a platform for the growth of creative industries.  
In the case of Afghanistan, repeated cycles of conflict have made the growth of 
cultural policies all the more challenging. Despite difficulties, Afghan artists’ use of film, 
music, and theater in the reconciliation process – alongside radio, the press, and 
periodicals – have tried to tell national stories based on shared experiences of events. In 
Afghanistan, with involvement from various partners such as government and foreign 
organization, there are several examples that have focused on the use of art in attempts 
to facilitate healing and rebuild national identity. For instance, the establishment of a 
national war crime museum which focuses on the public acknowledgment of Afghan war 
victims, the National Victim’s Conference in Kabul with representatives from government, 
civil society, and victims of war from various regions in Afghanistan, also the 
establishment of organizations such as the Afghan Film Project that supports local 
filmmakers, along with many different art and culture festivals in different fields. However, 
despite all the efforts, because these activities and events usually concentrate on Kabul, 
with its continued occurrence of conflicts and attacks, one can question the success of 
such endeavours in Afghanistan.  
As Afghanistan’s governmental structure is undergoing essential changes in the 
quest for a Western model, art and culture have also been shaped by the influence of 
foreign aid funds. Donors’ interests are in turn dictated by the foreign policy interests of 
different international stakeholders. Any Afghan organization or individuals who are in 
the fields of art or culture depend on these donors, and they are at times forced to shift 
points of view and activities to focus on what is requested of them by benefactors. 
Foreign aid and its NGOs are proving instrumental in dictating international policy 
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towards Afghanistan. Almost the majority are focused on gender, promoting human 
rights and women.  
On reflection, the level of attention paid to the plight of “Afghan women” since 
2001, year after year, was in sharp contrast to the silence that had marked the years of 
civil war after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989. This is important to note. 
During the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the body of scholarship on 
Afghanistan was mostly concerned with documenting formal political parties, tribal and 
sectarian groups, as well as broader geopolitical dynamics that exacerbated the conflict. 
The primary objective of these portrayals has been to explore the limitations and 
potentials of the state, the tribe, and Islam for nation building and the formation of 
political ideologies. The absence of women from these descriptions and documents sets 
them at a distance from the literatures that were produced after the U.S. Invasion of 
Afghanistan. But the argument is the same as the one the U.S.S.R. used to invade 
Afghanistan. We are here to save the people. The U.S.S.R. used the class argument and 
the U.S. gender. 
When the United States began bombing Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, the 
oppression of Afghan women was the moral grammar mobilized to rally popular 
support for the military invasion of the country. This classic form of colonial feminism was 
reactivated through major news outlets, in documentaries, feature films, and pop culture 
in general. Films about Afghanistan and especially Afghan women were in strong 
demand by festival programmers around the world. As Jennifer Heath and Ashraf 
Zahedi note, “After 9/11, writers and photographers flooded the country, each 
apparently with a book contract and a new angle on ways to describe the ever-intriguing, 
ever-photogenic burqa”23 Many books and articles were written concerning Afghan 
                                                
23 Jennifer Heath and Ashraf, Zahedi. eds. 2011. Land of the Unconquerable : The Lives of Contemporary 
Afghan Women. Berkeley: University of California Press. Accessed May 26, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central. 
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women’s rights. To name a few: Land of the Unconquerable: The Lives of Contemporary 
Afghan Women (eds. Jennifer Heath and Ashraf Zahedi), Veiled Courage: Inside the 
Afghan Women's Resistance (Cheryl Benard), Behind the Burqa: Our Life in Afghanistan 
and How We Escaped to Freedom (Batya Swift Yasgur), From Patriarchy to 
Empowerment: Women’s Participation, Movements, and Rights in the Middle East, North 
Africa and South Asia (eds by Valentine M. Moghadam) were presented in international 
conferences. Women in blue chadari (burqa in Arabic) have become the reductionist 
epitome of the image and idea of women in Afghanistan. Through these 
representations, the U.S. gained the support of audiences in NATO member states to 
justify the ongoing need for their presence in the region. However, the women in the 
chadari are one of many realities of Afghanistan. While there are women who wear 
chadari, beside them there are also women who are doctors working in the most remote 
areas. Women who are running their own businesses, women who are teaching at 
university, and women who are active in media and communications as writers, 
programmers, and directors.  
As I mentioned above, the foreign policy interests of different international 
stakeholders have an essential effect on art and cultural activities inside Afghanistan. The 
military invasion and on-going ‘colonial presence’ in Afghanistan was framed by the 
mission to rescue ‘Afghan women’ and ‘girls’ from repression by the Taliban, not just in 
political and legal actions, but also in influencing cultural practices. This motto and the 
embedded visual vocabulary of imperial powers were disassembled through art that 
investigated chadari-wearing female figures as its main focus.  
On the same note, Paniz Musawi Natanzi in her article “Art, Geopolitics, and 
Gendering in Afghanistan” observes that contemporary women artists in Afghanistan 
received wide attention during the reconstruction of the Afghan state in the years 
preceding the US invasion. Afghan artists and especially “Afghan women artists working 
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on women’s rights, children, peace or attempts at countering violence, drugs and 
corruption have higher chances of being financially supported by donors from NATO 
member”.24 They serve as objectified figures to showcase Western nation-state-building 
processes as the judicial, socio-political, and economic model of justice. 
During the post-2001 period, many different fiction and documentary films were 
produced by Afghan filmmakers. To list a few here: Osama (Siddiq Barmak, 2003), Three 
Dots (Roya Sadat, 2003), Earth and Ashes (Atiq Rahimi, 2004), Choori Forosh (Razi 
Mohebi, 2006), Playing the Taar (Roya Sadat, 2008) and Kabuli Kid (Barmak Akram, 
2008), the majority of which deal with Afghan society, leaving the foreigners off the 
screen. Family conflicts are shown, as are conflicts across generations, the abuse of 
women’s rights, and the oppressive structures of warlordism/feudalism. Culturally, then, 
the war is always present in its devastating effect on people’s living conditions and 
psyches.  
The present absence of foreigners, especially the NATO armed troops, aid 
workers, foreign diplomats and consultants in Afghan films, are complex and 
contradictory. This is because the relationship of the younger generation of filmmakers 
with foreigners is affected not only by the international military presence in Afghanistan -  
the partially stable security and the freedom to work on cinema - but also by filmmakers’ 
dependence on international funding. Not many of them could afford to work 
independently of foreign donors or Afghan TV budgets.  
Roya Sadat (born 1983), a native from Herat province, start her filmmaking career 
as a producer and director after the fall of the Taliban. She was the first woman director 
in the history of Afghan cinema in the post-Taliban era, and ventured into making fiction 
and documentary films that deal with the themes of injustice and the restrictions 
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Policy (2017). 
 28  
imposed on women. In 2003, she made her first short film Three Dots, which claimed 
many national and international awards. After the success of her film, she went back to 
continue her studies and she graduated from the Law and Politics faculty of the 
University of Herat in 2005. After graduating from university, she attended the Asian Film 
Academy in South Korea in 2006 for a short period of time. Upon returning back to 
Afghanistan, TOLO TV, the biggest private TV channel in Afghanistan, approached her 
to direct a TV series, and that was when she decided to move to Kabul to have better 
access to the resources that were more available there in comparison to other cities. She 
and her sister Alka Sadat, a documentary filmmaker, established the ROYA Film House 
(RFH) and under this banner produced more than 30 documentaries and feature films. 
Due to the shortage of skilled female professionals in the film and media environment, 
RFH offers training for young women in four different fields: photography, 
cinematography, editing and animation. Sadat also co-founded the first International 
Women Film Festival in Afghanistan.  
Looking at the overall history of cinema in Afghanistan, or Afghanistan itself as a 
country, the questions arising have to do with domination, the struggle for autonomy, 
spheres of influence, and a balance of power - crucial for any genuine understanding of 
the more general social and political frameworks for this new wave of filmmaking. Film in 
the past was a propaganda tool in the hands of government, but in the hands of artists 
and activists, it was a tool for communication and social change, often relying upon the 
formation and transformation of subjectivity. Current Afghan cinema, however, is 
breaking the link between action and reaction; this marks a shift from the cinema of 
Communism to the post-Taliban filmmaking environment.  
Specifically, current cinema approaches the situation by depicting the 
experiences of individuals caught in the midst of these clashes. By providing insight into 
the lived experiences of individuals in these sites of conflict, cinema complicates the 
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hegemonic narrative. The experience, the fundamental pivot in these movies, is personal 
and political. The filmmaker, making a movie about a subject of civic importance, adds 
much to its substance, value, and usefulness when the project becomes a reflection or 
an engagement emerging from the filmmaker’s private life and intimate experience. This 
personal engagement is necessary, because the film lays claim to a political reality. The 
shift mentioned above is in response to contemporary socio-economic formations, a 
response to the analyses of political theorists attempting to understand the evolution of 
politics in the 21st century. The emergence of neoliberal economic policies, and the 
growth of networked information systems, have restructured the film/media cultural 
industries, as my subsequent chapters will reveal. All components of the filmmaking 
process, the contexts of production and distribution, are factors crucial for an 
understanding of film aesthetics. Third Cinema, after various crises – both political and 
economic in different geopolitical settings – carries a project of decolonizing both a 
people and the imagination. Its combination of filmmaking and criticism, and, most of 
all, the ways in which it has turned the spectator into a guerilla resister and an ally, makes 
Third Cinema profoundly important for a cinematic history of resistance to neoliberalism. 
It is to this struggle and this mode of cinematic conception that this thesis now turns, 
firstly through an analysis of production contexts. 
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Chapter Two 
The Journey of Making 
Three Dots (2003) 
A Letter to the President (2016) 
 
Cinema has developed as one of the most captivating and expensive of the 
communications media. No other art form has circulated as effectively, nor has it 
surpassed so many national and cultural boundaries. Unlike other art forms, films are 
created almost solely for mass distribution. Looking from the outside, following the news 
about films being produced in Afghanistan in the past two decades, the enthusiasm 
surrounding them gives the impression that the Afghanistan film industry has been born 
again. But in the summer of 2018, while visiting Kabul - home to many filmmakers, 
production companies, TV stations and various media platforms, institutions with the 
one important agenda of training the new generation of technicians and artists - I came 
to a different conclusion.  
In the early days of academic film studies, national cinema was generally an 
unproblematic category and implied a natural relationship between nation and film. 
Andrew Higson, in his 1989 article “The Concept of National Cinema,” points towards an 
“inward-looking” perspective where national cinema can only be understood as “histories 
of crisis and conflict, of resistance and negotiation.”25 He understands national cinema 
not as unified and homogenous, but as a “relationship to already existing national 
political, economic and cultural identit[ies] ... and set of traditions”.26 It provides a link 
that helps reveal the contradictions and gaps, and the tensions between the hegemonic 
and non-hegemonic ideologies at work in the cinematic discourse of a nation-state.  
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10.1093/screen/30.4.36   
26 Andrew Higson, “The Concept of National Cinema,” 42. 
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Stephen Crofts, coming with a similar perspective in his article “Concepts of 
National Cinema” (1994), argues that, in order to better understand national cinemas, it 
is important to analyze them in terms of these categories: “production”, “audiences” 
“discourses”, “national-cultural specificity”, “the cultural specificity of genres and nation-
state cinema movement”, and “the role of the state”.27 Cultural, economic, and political 
contexts influence the conventions of national cinemas. National cinema as a social 
practice becomes the place of debates about a nation’s history, conflicts, heritage, and 
governing principles.  
In conversation with professionals in the film and cinema field, such as directors, 
producers, film professors, writers, photographers, actors, I realized that there is no such 
thing as a film industry in Afghanistan in the conventional sense of the term. Looking at 
the exact meaning of ‘industry’ in a dictionary, you will find two types of definition; one 
defines industry as “an activity or domain in which a great deal of time or effort 
is expended”28. Making a film is not a solo project and it requires a group of 
professionals to participate in it, which is certainly hard work, even harder in the case of 
Afghanistan where one has to try to make the impossible possible. At every step, 
filmmaking requires every conceivable source of time and effort. 
The second definition of industry declares it to be “a particular form or branch of 
economic or commercial activity.”29 Due to the slow cycle of film production in 
Afghanistan, where, in the span of three to four years, only one feature film was made, 
this industry cannot generate meaningful profit through commercial ads, ticket or DVD 
sales. Other revenues such as merchandising dollars, television rights, video-on-demand 
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(VOD) and streaming are opportunities that seem impossible in a setting like 
Afghanistan. 
To identify the parameters governing cinematic production in Afghanistan, and 
point out some of the persistent challenges faced by filmmakers, one needs to take a 
closer look at the context. To do this, I am following the path of one filmmaker as a case 
study in order to draw on reliable data.  
The economics of movie making render it an extremely risky investment, and the 
risk factor is much higher in Afghanistan. The prohibitive cost of producing films for most 
independent filmmakers around the world is a struggle. Insufficient funding for 
production is not something specific to one geographical location. Filmmakers in 
Afghanistan are also in this bind. With the absence of government support for film and 
cinema, and reduced security challenging the trust of private investors, the filmmakers 
are on their own. Most films that were made after 2001 were produced in three different 
ways. The first is that the director, besides her/his Afghan citizenship, also holds another 
citizenship from either a European or North American country. These returnee Afghan 
film-makers arrive in Afghanistan with a fully funded project and tend to bring their own 
crews and equipment in order to ensure the professional standards that are not yet 
common in the domestic film industry. A few fiction films that have been made this way 
since 2001 and include: Earth and Ashes (Atiq Rahimi, 2004), Kabuli Kid (Barmak Akram, 
2008), The Black Tulip (Sonia Nassery Cole, 2010), The Patience Stone (Atiq Rahimi, 
2012), Wajma, an Afghan Love Story (Barmak Akram, (2013), Mina Walking (Yosef Baraki, 
2015) and Black Kite (Tarique Qayumi, 2017). 
  The second mode of film production in Afghanistan sees local filmmakers making 
their films with the help of foreign organizations. The aid either comes as equipment 
rental, or financing either a portion or all of the production cost. In this case, the 
technical crew is usually local. Some of this second group’s feature films are: In Foreign 
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Land (Hafiz Asefi, 2000), Osama (Siddiq Barmak, 2003), Opium War (Siddiq Barmak, 
2008), Hope (Abul-Samie Majroh, 2008), and Sheep and Wolf (Shahrbanoo Sadat, 
2016).  
 The fact that these two modes of production connect is due to conditions put in 
place through economic neoliberalism, which opens up means of financial support for 
film production that I will now lay out. Economic neoliberalism is an economic theory, a 
set of economic policies and an ideological conviction that supports uncontrolled 
competition by maximizing economic freedom for individuals, which thus reduces the 
amount of state intervention to the bare minimum.30 In this regard, as Joseph Nathan 
Cohen and Miguel Angel Centeno explain, neoliberalism advocates for the elimination 
of government-imposed restrictions on transnational movements of goods, capital and 
people.31 
Mette Hjort in The Cinema of Small Nations lists the key development factors of 
neoliberal economy as: “[the] transnational imperative of finance capital, the 
deregulation of markets, the increasing geographical mobility of labour, and the global 
penetration of communications networks facilitating business, information, 
entertainment and other forms of cultural exchange.”32 These measures have permeated 
the boundaries of the nation-state - as the primary unit of economic, political and cultural 
differentiation in the world system – and have also weakened the regulatory control of 
governments, thereby eroding the sense, and indeed the reality, of national autonomy.  
Looking at neoliberalism in relation to Afghanistan, Naomi Klein’s book The Shock 
Doctrine (2007) explains how post-conflict reconstruction projects in the country have 
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become ways of enforcing and intertwining the policies of the United States and the 
World Bank. Through these, the objectives of neoliberalism come to life by way of 
pacification and privatisation. The World Bank administers the country’s aid through a 
trust fund and it has already managed to privatize health care by refusing to give funds 
to the Ministry of Health to build hospitals. It has also increased the participation of the 
private sector in the water system, telecommunications, oil, gas and mining, and 
directed the government to ‘withdraw’ from the electricity sector and leave it to ‘foreign 
private investors.’33 The aid industry, which mostly runs through NGOs, dictates terms to 
the Afghan people and the government. NGOs are accountable to their funders, 
enriching them, not the people amongst whom they work.   
The absence of a fully developed film industry in a country such as Afghanistan 
has required an engagement with others in relation to the current debates concerning 
national and transnational cinema. The concept of ‘national cinema’ along with the 
status of the nation state can be brought into question by the impact of globalisation. As 
discussed previously, Afghanistan’s long history of war and invaders, its current position 
in the world as a sovereign nation-state, as well as a contested space in a transitional 
state under UN mandate, still has not stabilized its central government after two 
decades, and its economy is very fragile. 
The ambiguous state of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the global 
routes of the opium trades, the ongoing war and conflict, and the presence of U.S. and 
NATO military forces are all further indications of the fluidity and instability of 
Afghanistan’s borders that shape the contexts of Afghan economic, political and cultural 
agency. These conditions have had a strong impact on Afghanistan’s national film policy, 
which is less concerned with protecting local production or culture, perceived as being 
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under threat from Americanisation or Iranianization, and instead is embracing the 
putative benefits of the division of cultural labour, and the abstract levels of inward 
investment that minor foreign-funded productions might bring in terms of local 
employment and the purchase of goods and services.  
In conversation with local Afghan filmmakers, who are only able to produce a 
feature in the span of every three to four years, it appears that they have proven 
supportive of such changes, which have brought greater freedom, opportunity, choice 
and diversity. But, as Hjort sees it, the transformative effect of globalisation on the 
international motion picture industry is the “shift from a cultural to an economic” set of 
priorities, which, while it can have the effect of boosting the international status and 
visibility of small or minor players, is also a threat to “the erosion of cultural difference 
and non-commercial filmmaking practices that might be entailed by acquiescence to a 
Hollywood/American agenda.”34  
Neo-colonialism – via the Western media and Hollywood films - constitutes the 
greatest impediment to an evolution of national ideology in Third World countries. 
Because of the former’s advantage over technology and education, these sectors have 
been successful in setting the agenda for news and information in Third World countries. 
The representations of Afghanistan in Western films offer an image of warlord-ridden 
land of strife and oppression, and Afghan people as barbarians, ferocious Pashtun 
tribesmen, or noble savages. The influential essay, “On Violence,” by Frantz Fanon, 
details how representational violence is consistently done to “dehumanizes the 
colonized subject.” 35  
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The customs, tradition and the myths: are the very mark of this indigence 
and innate depravity […] it is an impassionate claim that their world is 
fundamentally different […] with the help of his agents of law and order 
[…] the colonist turns the colonized into a kind of quintessence of evil […] 
the ‘native’ is declared impervious to ethics, representing not only the 
absences of values but also the negation of values […] in other words, 
absolute evil. A corrosive element, destroying everything within his reach, a 
corrupting element, distorting everything within which involves aesthetics 
or morals, and agents of malevolent powers, an unconscious and incurable 
instrument of blind forces.36  
 
The limited selection of perspectives and information presented in the mainstream 
media are encoded with a language and sources of visual information that are 
inadequate and disconnected from the lived reality. 
It is noteworthy here to mention the presence of Iranian filmmakers who have 
produced films in Afghanistan or in Iran based on Afghan subjects, a situation which has 
become more prevalent since 2001 in Iranian global art house cinema. The trend started 
with the Makhmalbaf clan, and the number of films they made in Afghanistan, such as 
Journey to Kandahar (Mohsen Makhmalbaf, 2001), Five in the Afternoon (Samira 
Makhmalbaf, 2003), Joy of Madness (Hana Makhmalbaf, 2003), Stray Dogs (Marzieh 
Meshkini, 2004), and Buddha Collapsed out of Shame (Hana Makhmalbaf, 2007). So, 
what about these films and their impact on Afghanistan visual identity? Kamran Rastegar, 
in his essay “Global Frames on Afghanistan,” points to the important role these films 
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have played in “producing a cinematic framework for viewing the contemporary history 
of Afghanistan; nonetheless, in the years immediately following the 2001.”37  
The success of Iranian films on Afghanistan, such as Journey to Kandahar, in major 
film festivals around the world, followed by their commercially successful reception in the 
Global art cinema market, helped to create a global cinematic discourse, and to some 
extent public discourse. These films have been influential in setting the terms of political 
and cultural debates in Europe and U.S. As Rastegar points out, “elite commentators, 
journalists, and activists are very often among the audiences of art house cinema, 
particularly cinema that addresses topical or controversial international issues.”38 The fact 
that these films were made by people who share the same language and culture as 
Afghanistan brings them more weight in the eyes of Western cultural figures and 
intellectuals.   
Another important relation between Afghanistan and Afghan films involves 
projects that were produced by, or with the significant involvement of, Iranian film 
producers, such as Osama (Siddiq Barmak, 2003), which is as the most famous title 
among them. Osama, an international co-production between Afghanistan, Iran, the 
Netherlands, Japan, and Ireland, was produced with technical assistance from Mohsen 
Makhmalbaf, and with post production funds from European sources. The technicians 
who worked on the film are the same people who have contributed to many previous 
projects with the Makhmalbafs. Because of its film distribution contract with MGM, and 
other major studios in the U.S., Osama has been a commercial success to this day, rare 
for an Afghan film.  
The third way that the filmmakers or producers make films is through personal 
investment, going into personal debt to fund their project. Help comes from family and 
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friends for location, transportation and borrowing items for the set design. Some of 
these films are: An Apple from Paradise (Hamayoun Marowat, 2008), Mirage (Ghorban-
Ali Mirzayi, 2008), A Letter to the President (Roya Sadat, 2016), and The Faceless (Ali 
Akbar Akbar Kamal, 2017). There are a lot of low budget action, commercial, B movies 
that fall under this category. The Afghan director Salim Shaheen is one of the most active 
and prolific directors within this genre. His films are distributed through low quality DVD 
and VCDs; the majority of the audience for his films are Afghan males.  
Certainly, the list of the names could be longer, but the lack of a database makes 
it difficult to search for them, which it is the same case for the second group. There is not 
enough information about these films, especially the independent productions in the 
third group, which is another sign of their low budgets. Distributing and advertising for a 
film requires another budget, which these teams cannot provide. Looking in both 
English and Dari, and searching through national and international media platforms, 
does not easily locate this information. 
As I introduced earlier in this project, Roya Sadat, like many filmmakers and artists, 
started working with minimal financial support and primitive technical equipment. Her 
films belong to the third mode of production. Sadat’s two low budget short films, Three 
Dots (2003) and Playing the Taar (2008), were both completed with basic technology. 
Her first feature film, A Letter to the President (2016), was also made the same way. 
Working with miniscule budgets is the only way of filmmaking in Afghanistan; it is also a 
way of life for Afghan people given the poor and unstable economy of the country.  
 Poverty is widespread in Afghanistan, especially among rural populations. 
Regional and seasonal differences are important aspects of poverty. Poverty and food 
insecurity are multifaceted phenomena; people depend on low physical, financial assets 
and unskilled human capital. Temperatures vary dramatically through the seasons, with 
hot summers and frigid winters; and, similarly, there are stark differences in elevation and 
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terrain across regions. Both elements, the regional and the seasonal, correlate with 
poverty outcomes, and, in some cases, they interact in ways that directly affect well-
being. For example, severe winter conditions affect transportation and, in high 
mountainous areas, such as the Bamyan, Daikundi or Badakhshan provinces, roads are 
often blocked throughout the winter due to heavy snow accumulation. These 
communities in particular are forced to rely only on the food supplies that households 
store before the winter. Unsurprisingly, these three provinces all have poverty rates that 
are much higher than the national average. 
The main source of income in the country is agriculture, a key economic sector. 
Over 80% of Afghans live in rural areas and are engaged in agriculture and livestock-
raising, which both contribute about more than 40% of the country’s GDP - minus the 
opium economy.39 Agricultural production is constrained by an almost total 
dependence on erratic winter snows and spring rains for water; the water supply is 
primitive and the use of machines, chemical fertilizer, or pesticides is not widespread.  
Low investments, natural disasters, the country’s extreme susceptibility to water 
shortages (due to many factors such as the reduction and loss of Afghanistan’s glaciers), 
worsening drought, and poor management of waste and pollution has caused a rise in 
poverty, especially in rural Afghanistan. 
However, this decline in agriculture was not only due to environmental issues but 
also the outcomes of war-related damage to the irrigation systems by various hostilities, 
artillery shelling, the blowing up of bridges in bomb blasts, expansive areas covered in 
landmines, and the imposition of frequent sieges and attacks by the Taliban or NATO 
troops.40 As a result, around a million people have been uprooted and displaced from 
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their villages into urban areas, which brings further negative impact in the form of 
unemployment, poverty, weakened infrastructures, and a decline in human health, all of 
which cause more trauma, stress. Many households take loans, from family and friends, 
or through mortgaging land. Taking out a loan for the majority of people is a coping 
strategy to meet basic needs such as food and health care. Indebtedness is a factor in 
both the creation as well as the perpetuation of poverty, which leads to forced labour 
migration. Labour migration, both inside and outside Afghanistan, is a very important 
income strategy for over a quarter of households. For the poor, it is a crucial way of 
coping with uneven job opportunities inside the village, or of seeking better-paid work 
elsewhere.41 As I mentioned earlier, taking loan is also a coping strategy to meet the 
basic needs of local filmmakers who, without any other kind of investment or support, 
need to find a way to finance their project.  
In a conversation with Roya Sadat, these situations reveal themselves through the 
production journey of her short film Three Dots (2003), offering a glimpse of a revival of 
cinema in Afghanistan while at the same time mirroring the situation conditioning 
Afghan society and its filmmaking. Sadat was the host of a children and youth television 
program while writing the story of her film. In 2002, through a journalist, she got to know 
about Siddiq Barmak and gained his contact information. In a phone conversation with 
Barmak, Sadat talked about her film script and her plan for making it and he promised to 
help her acquire a camera and sound equipment from Afghan Film (the state 
production studio). The same year, Sadat was part of a team representing Herat 
province, and journeyed to Kabul to participate in a national conference called Youth 
and Civil Society. During that trip, she met Barmak in person and he put her in contact 
with a French NGO who were offering funding of $2000.00 to young Afghan filmmakers. 
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She came back and started preparing for the production. The fund from the French 
NGO covered the rental fee of the equipment and the labour of the technicians and the 
editor. The shoot took over three weeks and she could only pay the lead actress and a 
few local people that acted in the film. One of her family members, who was the 
employee at a hotel in Herat, offered to provide room and meals for the 
cinematographer and sound technician who come from Kabul to help make the film.42  
The story of the film takes place in the Province of Herat, in the rural area close to 
the border with Iran. The poverty and the harsh conditions of the environment are 
present in every scene. The lives of the people in the movie run parallel with the reality of 
rural life in Afghanistan. The landmines spread all over and the people with missing and 
amputated limbs walking around are other bitter realities which dictate how these 
people live. She found the sources of her inspiration for this film in stories she heard 
from people, and mostly women and children, who had been displaced from rural areas 
and had come into the cities because of continued years of drought during the Taliban 
era. The majority of the men were forced into the opium trade and drug trafficking. 
These people, mostly women and children, were either residing in tents on the outskirts 
of the city, or had come into the cities and were living in the streets and alleys. Director 
Roya Sadat says that, even though she has lived her entire life in Afghanistan and 
experienced the Civil War and also the Taliban, when interacting with people and 
especially women from other parts of the Herat province, she noticed that, while all 
Afghans suffered from the same condition, the level of damage is certainly not the same 
for everyone. Three Dots is the story of the destruction of these families.43 
The plot of the movie centres on a young single woman named Gul-Afrooz, who 
lives in a village in northwestern Afghanistan along the border of Iran and struggles to 
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raise her three children. Although, at first, she was engaged to her lover Firooz, she has 
been forced to marry an older man, who goes missing in a drug smuggling trip. Now 
she works inside the house of a local warlord, Khan, who pushes her into delivering 
drugs across the border and, when she refuses, she loses her job at his house. There is 
not much to do in a small village to make a living, since drought has crippled all the 
families living there. She asks friends and family for bowls of flour. She goes to the desert 
to collect bramble and exchanges it for food. Since everyone in the village is poor and 
suffers a broken family like herself, nothing works in her favour. She is caught up in 
traditional structures, and the hunger and illness of her children force her to accept 
Khan’s offer. On her way to Iran as a drug courier, she is arrested by Iranian police and 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  
 All of the characters in the film are played by non-actors. Besides the lead actress, 
Gol-Afrooz, and two other young females, who travelled with the director from the city to 
the location, the other characters in the film are all played by local people, people who 
have been deprived of everything. As I mentioned earlier, in Afghanistan the literacy rate 
is very low, in rural areas it amounts to a single digit percentage. During the shoot, Sadat 
recalls a day, while they were filming an outdoor scene, when a group of young 
motorcyclists who were in their teens or early twenties, came and circled them. These 
young men had heard about the shooting crew and came from other villages to see. 
They started asking Sadat the question of what the crew were doing here? They asked to 
be shown how camera and the sound system worked. She filmed them and showed 
them on the little screen they had. Sadat says that what fascinated one of them was not 
the image but the sound. One touched the wire of the headphone, asking how is it 
possible that sound moves through this cable?44  
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It may sound strange for us reading this today that they were unaware of an 
almost century-old technology. But we are talking about 2002, right after the fall of the 
Taliban and, before that, the bloody civil war that crippled the Afghan people and these 
young men who all their lives had been kept away from anything that could possibly 
allow them to think in other ways. 
Sadat recalls another incident when they were shooting a night scene and their 
only way to light the scene was to use a lantern, since the lighting equipment they had 
brought was burned. While shooting, they notice that something faraway with a very 
powerful light on it was moving toward them at high speed. The light came closer and 
closer and eventually arrived: a young man with very tired face on a motorcycle and a 
young sick woman sitting behind him. She was pregnant with a complication and they 
were driving a long way to try to reach a clinic in the city. They saw the light of the lantern 
in the darkness of the night and drove towards it. The husband told them that they had 
previously lost a child and this time they were trying to save it. The young pregnant 
woman was the first female to leave their village for pregnancy treatment.45  
Another occurrence, which paints a better picture of the condition these people 
are living through, happened in the house in which the film crew was staying with one of 
the local families where the man was the elder of the village. Slowly, Sadat noticed that 
he was a bandit, stopping the cars passing through his area and taking their valuables. 
One day, it seems that he returned with a good haul and his young children became 
extremely happy and excited. They would jump down the roof and go up again, 
repeating the same activity while shouting in extreme happiness. Sadat adds that our 
beliefs and principles are all forms that change as our lives do, the experiences we go 
through, but sometimes through observing the situation of others. She adds that 
“though at core I believed the man’s actions to be wrong, and felt sorry for the travellers 
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who lost their goods because maybe among them were people suffering the same level 
of poverty, seeing the happiness on the faces of these children who had not had a 
proper meal for a while made me very happy.“46    
There is wedding scene in the film where one of the male characters, named 
Sher, is marrying a very young girl. The man was one of the local people participating, 
and the girl came from the city to play a role in the film. Later on, the film crew had to 
change their location due to a security threat they had received and they planned to 
leave there as soon as possible. The man who played the character of Sher would not 
allow them to leave and remonstrated that the young woman was his wife and that they 
could not take her away. Sadat relates, “I repeatedly explained to him that this was film 
and the events in the film are the re-enactment of reality we are living, and this marriage 
was also one of them and it doesn’t mean anything.”47 But the man kept insisting that 
they had conducted the ceremony and it was a real wedding. Finally, he agreed to let 
her go if the divorce went through. The mullah of the village had to come and divorce 
them officially. 
For me, writing down the stories and incidents that Sadat encountered during the 
production of Three Dots is an attempt to better understand the situation in which 
people in rural areas were living right after the fall of the Taliban, though the quality of 
life has not changed for them until this day. Their economic poverty is something that is 
the first thing that becomes apparent, but the consequences of this condition, which 
spill over into education, health and the future of these people, can only reveal 
themselves when one interacts with them.  
One of the problems with which South and Central Asian countries such as 
Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are dealing is the radicalization of young people. 
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The younger generation, mostly angry young men growing up in poverty, who are not 
able to go to school or find jobs, are therefore a good target for the groups such as the 
Taliban and ISIS to radicalize for a good number of reasons. 
Here we see the impact of the Madrasa – the Islamic school – and how it has 
come into existence. In my own personal experience during my trip to Herat in 2014, I 
came across two Madrasas. One was by the Gazur Gah Shrine, the resting place of the 
important Sufi figure and poet, Khwajah Abdullah Ansari, also known as Pir-i Herat, 
located in the historic part of city which is a tourist attraction. Young boys of different age 
ranges were out sitting under the trees in groups reading the Qur’ān.  
The other school was located between Herat City and Karukh District, which is 
50km northeast of Herat. Passing through in a car, at first, I didn’t know that this was an 
Islamic school, I stopped to take a look at it since, against all the mud houses and the 
tents of displaced people along the road, the building, with its attractive, white Islamic 
architecture, was like a shining jewel falling into a desert full of dirt. I was denied entry 
because I am a woman and it was an exclusively male school. On the plaques of both 
schools, the year of their establishment was written. It was in the past decade, and when I 
asked around about the school, what I learned was that these schools are usually funded 
by the Saudi and Iranian governments, depending on whether they are Shia or Sunni.  
With the advent of Islam in Afghanistan in the seventh century, education within 
the framework of Islam thus has existed for more than a millennium. Islamic education 
takes place in common institutions such as mosques, madrasa, and Qur’ān schools, as 
well as in Western types of schools, and reading and memorizing the Qur’an are the 
prime objectives of Islamic education.48  
                                                
48 Pia Karlsson and Amir Mansory. “Islamic and Modern Education in Afghanistan - Conflictual or 
Complementary?” In Educational Strategies Among Muslims in the Context of Globalization: Some 
National Case Studies. ed. Holger, Daun And Geoffrey, Walford. (Brill Leiden Boston 2004), 90. 
 47  
  Madrasahs usually, as boarding institutions, accept students from different villages 
who attend the school and live there together. The aim of the madrasah is to provide 
“the specialists a Muslim society needs or, in other words, to produce masters in Islamic 
theology and law.”49 But, since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, these schools 
have been described as sources of terrorism. 
Thinking about education and its relation to cinema, in a society which has one of 
the lowest literacy rates in the world, one could think of filmmaking as the expansion of 
communications methods to convey messages and promote objectives. Here is a means 
of fostering social and political consciousness and a sense of belonging that instills 
confidence among Afghans by exploring Afghan societies and the role of tradition – in 
sum, the promotion of a progressive vision of education. Paulo Freire in Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed talks about the transformation of the marginal: 
 
The truth is, however, that the oppressed are not ‘marginals,’ are not people living 
‘outside’ society. They have always been ‘inside’—inside the structure which made 
them ‘beings for others.’ The solution is not to "integrate" them into the structure 
of oppression, but to transform that structure so that they can become ‘beings for 
themselves.’50   
 
Films can tackle what many have regarded as the archaic aspects of tradition that 
have blocked further social improvement for people, especially women, marginal 
communities, and the poor. Filmmaking is the action and reflection of men and women 
upon their world in order to transform it, even challenging the governments that have 
come to power, citing the rampant corruption and isolation of a disinterested political 
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elite as barriers to realizing the aspirations of the people following national liberation. As 
Freire continues, “Liberating education consists in acts of cognition, not transferrals of 
information.”51  Film can illuminate new perspectives, activating emotions and 
generating empathy in audiences, which can be substantive fuel for action. Coherent 
actions can facilitate major changes in society’s viewpoint, lexicons, values and practices: 
“consciousness as consciousness of consciousness.”52 Through the filmic medium, 
oppressed peoples can be alerted to the conditions of their exploitation.  
Three Dots is a work that is inexorably political because its characters are linked to 
a larger social framework: in the words of Deleuze and Guattari, an individual story 
‘necessarily expresses social contradictions and problems, or directly suffers their 
effects’.53 Sadat, as a female Afghan filmmaker, represents two different types of 
minorities at the same time. First is the nation of Afghanistan oppressed and victimized 
in the political and economic wars between world powers, and then the representation 
of the Afghan rural woman whose condition is the outcomes of bigger events and also 
the restricted traditions that limit her. This self-representation, as a form of self-
empowerment, gives an opportunity for Afghans to engage with the powerful 
ideologies of mass media in the region, as well as in the West. This position enables the 
filmmaker to express another possible community and to forge the means for different 
consciousnesses and sensibilities.  
These incidents that occurred during the production of Three Dots might place 
the film crew in opposition to the villagers, but the truth is that there are few differences 
between them in terms of education, social, and economic growth. While people in 
cities might be closer to health clinics, or can send their children to school, the poor 
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quality of education and the healthcare system does not remove them far from the 
situation experienced by rural populations.  
There are parallels and mirroring between Afghan cinema production and the 
society depicted in their films. An Afghan production crew works with limited resources 
of every kind and with the most primitive equipment. They use whatever tools are around 
to make their projects. Roya Sadat recalls a scene from shooting Three Dots, when she 
needed an overhead shot. First, her cinematographer who only had experience in 
journalism and covering news, had never heard of this technical term “top shot“ and, 
second, they did not have a crane or even a workable tripod to execute the shot. 
Eventually, she came up with the solution of tying the camera to the tripod with a scarf, 
then dangled it from a rooftop over the heads of the characters. Afterwards, the 
cinematographer told her, “You just needed to tell me you want a shot from God’s 
view.”54 
During this time – the early 2000s - recruiting female actresses was another 
stumbling block to producing films, leading to the employment of women from 
neighbouring Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. During the Mujahideen era, when people 
viewed cinema and music as products of communism, women who were active in these 
fields were the main targets of rape and sexual harassments, several female singers were 
shot dead and actresses went into hiding or left the country. Besides this, the 
Mujahideen and religious leaders also spread fundamentalist ideology among the 
people in regard to the status of women working in media. Women's disempowerment 
in Afghanistan persisted culturally through notions of nationalism, custom and tradition. 
However, through the state-building process, Western countries have forced the 
new government to pay special attention to women’s rights, positioning women in 
different levels of government. This unique relationship influences Afghanistan’s power 
                                                
54 Roya Sadat. Personal interview. Kabul, August 18, 2018 
 50  
structure, including its constitutional development, regardless of whether those in 
authority tend towards ‘Islamist’ or ‘secular’ political objectives.  
In Afghanistan, there is no law that forces women to cover their hair by wearing 
hijab, but women feel the social pressure to conform to taking the scarf in order to 
maintain their reputations. Sexual harassment and other forms of violence in public 
spaces are an everyday occurrence for women and girls, just as they are around the 
world, in both urban and rural areas, and in both developed and developing countries. 
Women and girls experience and fear various types of sexual violence, from unwanted 
sexual remarks and touching to rape and femicide. This happens on the streets, in and 
around public transportation, schools, and workplaces. Wearing the hijab allows women 
acceptance into certain social classes. It grants them more respect from their 
conservative society and more freedom to roam within public spaces with little or no 
feelings of guilt or shame from the community.  
Roya Sadat, after writing her script, looked for her lead actress for almost a year. 
Mojgan Joya, who played the role of Gol-Afrooz in the film Three Dots, was a mother of 
two and carpet weaving student when Sadat asked her to perform in the film. Joya took 
a big risk accepting the role, since, in 2003, the situation was not ready for women in the 
film and media industry. She joined the project with no acting background.55 Though 
the shortage of female actresses and female technicians in the Afghan film and media 
industries still persists, it is taking small steps toward improving. In recent years, popular 
Afghan television shows have played an important role in slightly softening the edge of 
general opinion in regards to how women appear on screen. However, female actresses 
limit themselves to the types of roles they are willing to play. For example, if there is 
scene where they need to have physical contact with a male co-star, some of them try to 
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not accept the role or ask the director to make changes in the script. But as I mentioned 
above, this stigma is changing slowly. 
One of the other issues affecting production is that of security which plays a big 
role in production. Depending on the location of shooting, the lack of security takes on 
different aspects. Film crews get threats all the time, anonymously. For example, in 2014, 
there was popular television show called Shirin, which received constant threats.  Aziz 
Deldar, the writer and co-directors of the show, mentions that “the location of the show 
got attacked at night by several hand bombs and, since there was no filming scheduled 
at that time, luckily no one got injured, but a lot of damage was sustained.”56  This tactic 
is being used by radicals to scare people and prevent any activity that is not in line with 
their agenda. This type of security issue places significant obstacles in the way of film-
making. 
The other kind of security issue that interposes, as I mentioned previously, is 
landmines which have considerable impact on people’s lives in Afghanistan. A report by 
The HALO Trust, a non-profit organization, funded by the British government, that works 
to remove debris left behind by war, reports that, “nearly 80 percent of the minefields in 
the country had been cleared in the past 30 years."57 Despite an effective demining 
program, and well-developed mines awareness, the mines continue to claim civilian 
victims every day. Seeing amputees is a common occurrence in every city in Afghanistan, 
particularly in rural areas close to borders, and important intersections on the roads. In 
the film Three Dots, there is scene where Gol-Afooz is gathering dry bushes in an effort 
to exchange them for food. Sadat recalls that, to protect her crew, and prevent any 
injurious incidents, before the film crew got out of their car to prepare for the shoot, she 
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walked every corner of that space first, to make sure there were no landmines.58 There is 
a character in the film, a young boy with amputated leg. Sadat says that this character 
was not in the original script, but because she saw many people with amputated limps, 
she decides to add it later.59  The shooting was finally over, luckily without any life-
threatening incident. 
The post production took a much longer period. Sadat says that she had to send 
the Afghan Film camera back to Kabul as soon as the shooting was over. She adds that, 
because there was no equipment with which to convert the mini DV tape and transfer 
the film into a digital format, every week she had to visit the main hotel in Herat City to 
ask if there were any foreign journalists with video cameras staying there.60 She needed 
the camera to do the transferring. After that, she spent another month going to a 
wedding videography store to edit the film.  
Three Dots was a great success for the young filmmaker. The film was immediately 
bought by the Human Rights Committee, and it screened in many film festivals around 
the world. Three Dots opened many doors and brought exposure for Sadat and she got 
invited to several national and international film festivals. After she finished her education 
– Political Science and Law – she was invited through Atiq Rahimi61 to join TOLO TV 
Station, and direct the first drama series ever entirely written, acted, filmed, produced 
and broadcast by Afghans, for Afghans in Afghanistan, The Secrets of This House. The 
show was a great success. While in Kabul, she and her sister, Alka Sadat62, established 
the first independent Afghan film company, Roya Film House, in 2003. We will read 
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61 Atiq Rahimi is a French-Afghan writer and filmmaker who made Earth and Ashes (2004) and The Patient 
Stone (2012). Rahimi, like many other artists, returned to Afghanistan after 2002 and joined the media 
Moby Group as an advisor. He currently lives in Paris.  
62 Alka Sadat is prolific documentary filmmaker whose works spans social, political and military subjects.  
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more about organizations like this and their impact on the education and mobilization of 
the new generation of Afghan artists presently.  
Sadat’s oeuvre also moved – though slowly - toward better cinematic quality. 
While working for TOLO TV, she made her second short film, Playing the Taar (2008), 
which is about a 17 years-old girl, named Ay Nabaat, from an ethnic minority (Turkman). 
She has woven carpets at home since childhood. Her father, in order to end his 
enduring bloody hostility that has lasted for years with another ethnic group (Tajik), 
marries Ay Nabaat to a man who already has four wives. After the marriage, when Ay 
Nabaat gets pregnant, her husband, in order to revenge his lasting hostilities, claims that 
the child is illegitimate. She is forced to give birth to her child in an abandoned and 
ruined house. We will return to this film later in a more detailed analysis. 
As with her first short film, Sadat used non-professional actors and again focused 
on a rural setting and a minority group. Since Sadat was working in television, for the 
production of this film, she had access to better equipment such as a camera and lights 
and was also in better financial situation, funding the whole film herself. 
Fast forward to 2016, after Afghanistan had passed through three presidential 
elections. The security situation has worsened. The central government struggle to even 
provide security and safety to only Kabul. The Taliban and the ISIS attacks increase in 
different parts of the country. The rate of suicide attacks is very high in Kabul and it has 
also gotten more difficult to travel and find appropriate shooting locations. Bamiyan, for 
example, a much-liked location for fiction and non-fiction film-makers, is not as easily 
accessible as it used to be. The same goes for other spots as well. Despite these 
conditions, many organizations related to cinema and film had been established. Some 
had been dissolved and some continued to work. Kabul city has fifteen radio and 
television stations. Kabul University established its first ever cinema faculty, and even 
though the cinema faculty is under the theater department, it retains its own 
